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THE EMERGING BIFURCATED STANDARD FOR
CLASSIFICATIONS BASED ON SEX
Until recently, sex-based classifications have been virtually im-
mune from attack under the equal protection clause. In roughly the
last decade, however, successful challenges have become increasingly
frequent, and currently this clause is a powerful weapon in combat-
ing publicly sanctioned sex discrimination.' Unfortunately, the courts
which have effected these changes have failed to provide a satisfactory
analytical basis for their decisions. The resulting confusion has been
greatly increased by the advent of sex-based classifications which are
intended to alleviate the effects of past discrimination by granting cer-
tain advantages to women today.2 In sharp contrast to the severe atti-
tude generally taken towards classifications which disadvantage wom-
en, the current judicial tendency is to treat these new "ameliora-
tive"' practices quite favorably. The disparity in the treatment of these
two types of classifications has been accomplished without any ade-
quate explanation in terms of legal theory. It is the purpose of this
Note to provide a full description of this important area of the law and
to suggest a comprehensive theoretical model for evaluating classifica-
tions based on sex. In so doing, it will be necessary first to describe
the currently available standards of review under the equal protection
clause. It will next be shown that the courts have traditionally em-
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS NOTE:
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REv. 1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther];
Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Equal Protection Developments].
1. Discrimination furthered by state action may be reached under the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment. When federal action is scrutinized, the ap-
propriate provision is the due process clause of the fifth amendment, which has been
held to include protections substantially the same as those afforded by the equal protec-
tion clause. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). See also United States v.
Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
2. This change has been felt most widely, and controversially, in the area of em-
ployment practices, where "affirmative action" programs granting preferences to women
have been highly publicized. For a proposed legal analysis of such programs, see notes
122-28 infra and accompanying text.
3. The discussion in this Note will use "ameliorative" in a narrow sense as desig-
nating practices which remedy the effects of past discrimination. A comprehensive
treatment of ameliorative classifications appears at notes 96-121 infra and accompanying
text.
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ployed the lowest of these standards (the rational basis test) to sex-
based classifications, with the result that such classifications were al-
most always upheld. The Note will then discuss the recent transition
to a stricter standard of review in sex discrimination cases. It will be
argued that the courts are applying sub rosa the highest standard of
review (the strict scrutiny test) to classifications which disadvantage
women and that the application of this standard is theoretically proper.
The discussion will then shift to the recent cases which apparently have
restored the rational basis test for ameliorative sex-based classifications.
This exemption of ameliorative classifications from stricter standards of
review will be justified by a basic policy analysis of the equal protection
clause. In conclusion, this Note will apply the proposed bifurcated test
to several areas in which classifications are commonly made on the
basis of sex.
THE THREE LEVELS OF REVIEW IN EQUAL PROTECTION CASES
Traditionally, governmental classifications have been upheld
against equal protection attack whenever the distinctions have borne
an arguable relationship (also called a "rational basis") to a legitimate
public objective.4 Typically, this objective was not required to have
been the dominant motivating force in the minds of the legislators who
enacted the provision, nor did it have to be demonstrated that the rela-
tionship of the distinction to the objective was grounded in fact.' Of-
ten, mere speculation on the part of the court as to -the existence of
this relationship was enough to sustain the classification. In recent
years, however, the Supreme Court has developed a higher standard
of review for classifications based upon either a "suspect" criterion such
as race,7 or a "fundamental" interest such as the exercise of a constitu-
4. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961); Allied Stores, Inc. v.
Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959); Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955);
Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs., 330 U.S. 552 (1947); Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). See generally Equal Protection Develop-
ments 1065.
5. See generally Equal Protection Developments 1077-87.
6. Equal Protection Developments 1080, citing Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464
(1948) (discussed in text at notes 30-31 infra) and Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot
Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947):
Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Cardozo, who thought the Court should ex-
ercise great restraint in reviewing state regulatory statutes, demonstrated con-
siderable imagination in the attribution of conceivable purpose. Historically,
the high point of imaginativeness in this area seems to have been attained at
the time when Mr. Justice Frankfurter's philosophy of restraint was at its ze-
nith.
7. Examples of suspect classifications, as defined by the Supreme Court, include
race, see McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964), and national ancestry, see
Korematsu v, United States, 323 T.T,$. 214, 216 (1944). Although the Court generally
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tional right.8 Such distinctions will be upheld only if they serve a
"compelling" state interest;9 furthermore, strict scrutiny, to determine
whether less restrictive alternatives can be used to achieve the same
ends, 10 will be applied in examining the' asserted relationship of the
classification to a legislative goal. In marked contrast to the extremely
slight risk of judicial disapproval under the traditional standard," ap-
plication of the newer test results in almost automatic invalidation. 12
After examining several recent Supreme Court cases, some com-
mentators have suggested that a new standard is developing. '13  Called
"rationality scrutiny" by one writer,' 4 this standard purports to apply
the traditional rational basis test, yet the legislation is often voided
pays close attention to a regulation which disadvantages the indigent, see, e.g., Harper
v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), it made it clear in San Antonio Inde-
pendent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), that wealth, per se, was not a
suspect classification.
8. Fundamental interests have been defined by the Court to include the right to
vote, see Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964), procreation, see Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Wil-
liamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), rights with respect to criminal procedure, such as
the right to counsel, see Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17-19 (1956), and interstate
travel, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969). In San Antonio Inde-
pendent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973), the Court said that funda-
mental rights for equal protection purposes are those "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed
by the Constitution."
9. For a discussion of what this test involves, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
11 (1967).
10. See generally Note, The Less Restrictive Alternative in Constitutional Adjudica-
tion: An Analysis, A Justification, and Some Criteria, 27 VAm. L. Rnv. 971 (1974).
If the statute in question can be more closely tailored to fit he evil at which it is aimed,
then this test will not be met. For cases where the Court found other means to achieve
the ends desired, see Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 348, 351 (1972); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 637 (1969); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91 n.3 (1965).
Hence, if a statute subject to the strict scrutiny standard is either over or underinclusive
and can reasonably be tailored more exactly to fit its purpose, it will be struck down
because there is a less restrictive alternative.
11. See Equal Protection Developments 1087; Note, Sex Discrimination and Equal
Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional Amendment?, 84 HAnv. L. REv. 1499, 1503
(1971).
12. At the time it considered the case, the Supreme Court had never found the com-
pelling state interest test to have been met. However, in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 408 (1963), the Court retroactively found a compelling state interest in Braunfeld
v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
13. See Gunther; Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Pro-
tection Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEo. L.J
1071 (1974); Comment, Equal Protection in Transition: An Analysis and a Proposal,
41 FoRDHAM L. Rav. 605 (1973); Note, New Standard Used for Equal Protection, 53
NEB. L. RaV. 312 (1974); cf. Sedler, The Legal Dimensions of Women's Liberation:
An Overview, 47 INr. LJ. 419, 451 (1972).
14. Gunther 21.
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where under the old standard it would have been upheld.15 The test
appears to be means-oriented 6 in that the Court attempts to make a
factual determination of whether the statute furthers a permissible ob-
jective rather than merely deferring to legislative judgment. As one
noted commentator has observed, "Judicial deference to a broad range
of conceivable legislative purposes and to imaginable facts that might
justify classifications is strikingly diminished. Judicial tolerance of
overinclusive and underinclusive classifications is substantially re-
duced.' 7  It must be noted, though, that while the elements of this
test have appeared in several recent Supreme Court cases, the Court
has never explicitly approved it.'8
THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH: MINIMAL SCRUTINY
APPLIED TO CLASSIFICATIONS BY SEX
Before 1971,1 the Supreme Court generally upheld the constitu-
tionality of sex-based classifications under the equal protection clause.
Applying the traditional standard of minimal scrutiny, the Court almost
invariably20 held that the distinction under attack was reasonable in
15. E.g., James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
406 U.S. 164 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Berkelman v. San Fran-
cisco Unified School Dist., 501 F.2d 1264 (1974); Boraas v. Village of Belle Terte, 476
F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). However, the validity of this stand-
ard has been thrown in doubt by the Supreme Court's reversal of the Second Circuit's
decision in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), rev'g 476 F.2d 806 (2d
Cir. 1973), and its analysis of the case on the traditional rational basis test after the
Second Circuit had analyzed it by use of the rationality scrutiny test. Furthermore, in
light of the Court's insistence on using the traditional test in San Antonio School Dist.
V. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), when, according to proponents of the new test, ration-
ality scrutiny might have been more appropriate, it is unclear whether the Court accepts
the new test. See generally Citizens Comm. v. Lindsay, No. 73-2590 at 589 n.5 (2d
Cir. Dec. 5, 1974).
16. For criticism of the means-oriented nature of the new test, see Nowak, supra
note 13, at 10-12; Comment, "Newer" Equal Protection: The Impact of the Means-Fo-
cused Model, 23 BuFFALo L. REv. 665, 678 (1974); Comment, Equal Protection in
Transition, supra note 13, at 635.
17. Gunther 20.
18. See note 15 supra.
19. The year 1971 is significant because it was then that the Supreme Court decided
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), where, for the first time since the aberrational Ad-
kins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), the Court invalidated a sex-discrimina-
tory statute on equal protection grounds. Although some commentators, e.g., Getman,
The Emerging Constitutional Principle of Sexual Equality, 1972 Sup. C r. REv. 157,
treated Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), as an equal protection case striking
down a sex-based classification, a close reading of the decision reveals that the result
was based on due process grounds and the importance of conceiving and raising chil-
dren, rather than on equal protection grounds. See Gunther 25.
20. The only exception was Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923). For
a discussion of the significance of this case, see note 23 infra.
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view of women's proper role in society2' or the need of the female sex
for greater protection. 22 The Court proceeded on the assumption that
there were vast differences between women and men,23 with the result
that the different treatment accorded the sexes could easily be found
to have a rational connection to a legitimate public objective.
Typical of the Court's approach under the minimal scrutiny stand-
ard were the leading cases of Muller v. Oregon24 and Goesaert v.
Cleary,25 both of which involved restrictions on the employment of
women.26 In Muller, the Supreme Court upheld a statute prescribing
a maximum workday for women 27 as a justifiable method of protecting
women from the injurious effects of long working hours.28 The Muller
21. E.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 61-63 (1961).
22. E.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
23. Though limitations upon personal and contractual rights may be re-
moved by legislation, there is that in her disposition and habits of life which
will operate against a full assertion of those rights. She will still be where
some legislation to protect her seems necessary to secure a real equality of
right. Doubtless there are individual exceptions, and there are many respects
in which she has an advantage over him; but looking at it from the viewpoint
of the effort to maintain an independent position in life, she is not upon an
equality. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908);
cf. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring). In-
deed, the only Supreme Court case in this period which did not sustain the constitution-
ality of female protective legislation was Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525
(1923), which invalidated a minimum wage law for women on the ground that the dif-
ferences between the sexes had come "almost, if not quite, to the vanishing point." Id.
at 553. Thus, Adkins explicitly recognized that the prior case law in this area was based
on the great differences the Court had seen between men and women.
24. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
25. 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
26. Proponents of much of this legislation maintained that they were motivated
solely by concern for women's welfare. See Brief for Appellants, Adkins v. Children's
Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Spritzer, Equal Employment Opportunity Versus Protection
for Women: A Public Policy Dilemma, 24 ALA. L. REv. 567 (1972). However, it is
clear that the effect of these regulations was to deny women employment opportunities.
See Mengelkoch v. Industrial Welfare Comm'n, 442 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 1971); Sedler,
supra note 13, at 434; Note, Protection, Poverty and the Woman Worker, 5 SuFFoLn
U.L. RFv. 139 (1970). This effect of "protective" legislation for women was not lost
upon men. As the president of the International Cigarmakers Union explained in
1879: "We cannot drive the females out of the trade, but we can restrict this daily quota
of labor through factory laws." Sedler, supra note 13, at 435 n.96, quoting A. HENRY,
THE TRADE UNION MOvEMENr 129 (1923).
27. Similar legislation which established a maximum working day for bakers had
previously been invalidated on due process grounds. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905). Perhaps Lochner can be distinguished on the basis that in Muller the court
perceived a threat to women's health from long hours of work, while in Lochner no such
threat to bakers' health was perceived.
28. [S]he is so constituted that she will rest upon and look to [her brother]
for protection; ... her physical structure and a proper discharge of her mater-
nal functions-having in view not merely her own health, but the well-being
of the race-justify legislation to protect her from the greed as well as the pas-
sion of man. 208 U.S. at 422.
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Court did not attempt to disguise its basic rationale that women were
properly assigned a lesser role in the scheme of things:
[H]istory discloses the fact that woman has always been dependent
upon man. He established his control at the outset by superior physical
strength, and this control in various forms, with diminishing intensity,
has continued to the present . . . . Differentiated by these matters
from the other sex, she is properly placed in a class by herself, and
legislation designed for her protection may be sustained, even when like
legislation is not necessary for men and could not be sustained.29
The Court was not always content to rest its decision on a consideration
of women's proper roles; at times, more generalized dangers were seen
as possibly arising from the removal of a restriction upon women. For
example, in Goesaert the Court sustained a statute forbidding any
woman to be a bartender unless she was either the wife or daughter
of a male owner of a liquor establishment s0 on the ground that such
a regulation was a tenable means of protecting the public morals. Ac-
cording to the Court, "[B]artending by women may, in the allowable
legislative judgment, give rise to moral and social problems against
which it may devise preventive measures . .".3." As recently as
1961 the Court was still applying the minimal scrutiny standard to sex-
based classifications. In Hoyt v. Florida,3" a Florida statute which pro-
vided that no woman should be selected for jury service unless she vol-
unteered3 3 was held not to be a denial of equal protection, even though
29. Id. at 421-22.
30. The same question as was presented in Goesaert has sometimes received a differ-
ent treatment in the lower courts. Brown v. Foley, 158 Fla. 734, 29 So. 2d 870 (1947),
considered the question a year before the Supreme Court decided Goesaert and con-
cluded that an ordinance which prohibited females from serving any liquor by the drink
over a bar was unreasonable. However, the opinion was noteworthy for its lack of rea-
soning, saying only that "[w]e can see no sound reason in law to sustain the ordinance
." Id. at 736, 29 So. 2d at 871. A more recent decision, Peterson Tavern & Grill
Owners Ass'n v. Borough of Hawthorne, 57 NJ. 180, 270 A.2d 628 (1970), reached
the same conclusion as Foley in striking down a Goesaert-type ordinance. In Peterson
Tavern, the court explicitly criticized Goesaert. Id. at 631. Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby,
5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971), utilized a farther-reaching rati6n-
ale in holding a statute prohibiting women from being bartenders unconstitutional under
the equal protection clause. The court in that case found that sex-based classifications
were suspect, and hence, subject to strict scrutiny.
31. 335 U.S. at 466. The Court implied that it was protecting the morality of soci-
ety as a whole and not merely of women bartenders, thus putting the case into the re-
strictive category rather than the protective category.
32. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
33. A statute which completely disallows women from jury service has never been
ruled upon by the Supreme Court, although a lower court held that such an Alabama
statute was invalid under the equal protection clause. White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401
(M.D. Ala. 1966). Currently there are no statutes which completely bar women from
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the exemption meant that virtually no women served on juries.M The
Court reasoned that women's responsibilities as "the center of home
and family life"35 were a sufficient reason for the legislature to excuse
them from mandatory jury duty.
Until recently the lower courts have generally followed the lead
of Muller, Goesaert, and Hoyt and have sustained sex-based classifica-
tions on equal protection grounds by applying the permissive rational
basis test.36  The general insensitivity to sex discrimination 7 which
jury duty. Johnston & Knapp, Sex Discrimination By Law: A Study in Judicial Per-
spective, 46 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 675, 716 (1971). The three such state statutes in existence
at the time of White have since been repealed. See A.A. CODE tit. 30, § 21 (Supp.
1973), amending ALA. CODE tit. 30, § 21 (1958); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-5-1 (1972),
amending MIss. CODE ANN. § 1762 (1942); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-52 (Supp. 1973),
amending S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-52 (1962). The Mississippi law was further amended
in 1974 to specifically state that sex shall not be a barrier to competency for jury duty.
Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-5-2 (Supp. 1974).
34. 368 U.S. at 58, 65. For example, in 1957 in one county in Florida there were
only ten women jurors out of a list with 10,000 names on it.
35. Id. at 62; ci. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 277-78 (1947); United States
v. Caci, 401 F.2d 664, 671 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 917 (1969); State
v. Alexander, 255 La. 941, 949, 233 So. 2d 891, 894 (1970), rev'd sub nom. Alexander
v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972). But see Taylor v. Louisiana, 43 U.S.L.W. 4167
(U.S. Jan. 21, 1975), where the Supreme Court struck down a statute similar to that
considered in Hoyt. In Taylor, the Court struck down the legislation on sixth and four-
teenth amendment grounds. According to the majority, "We are also persuaded that the
fair cross section requirement is violated by the systematic exclusion of women . .. ."
Id. at 4170. The Court distinguished Hoyt on the ground that it was not a sixth amend-
ment case. Id. at 4171. However, the validity of this distinction is thrown in doubt
when one considers that in Hoyt the statute was challenged by a female defendant con-
victed of murdering her husband, and surely the sixth amendment would apply. The
Court seemed to recognize this when it stated: "[We cannot follow the contrary impli-
cations of the prior cases, including Hoyt v. Florida. If it was ever the case that women
were unqualified to sit on juries or were so situated that none of them should be re-
quired to perform jury service, that time has long since passed." Id. at 4172.
36. The test has been used to uphold the draft against equal protection attack, see
e.g., United States v. Cook, 311 F. Supp. 618 (W.D. Pa. 1970); United States v. St.
Clair, 291 F. Supp. 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). It has been used to sustain legislation such
as the denial to women students of admission to Texas Agricultural and Mechanical Uni-
versity (reasoning that women were given the opportunity to attend other comparable
state-supported institutions and citing the emphasis on military training at Texas A &
M). Allred v. He~ton, 336 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. Civ. App.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 517
(1960); Heaton v. Bristol, 317 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
230 (1959). The permissive rational basis test has been used to uphold the rule that a
wife has no cause of action in tort for loss of consortium, while according the husband
such a right (this rule precluded the possibility of a double recovery should both husband
and wife recover for the same loss). Miskunas v. Union Carbide Corp., 399 F.2d 847
(7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1066 (1969). The courts have upheld a dormi-
tory curfew which applied only to women, basing this result on the idea that the safety
of the women students was a reasonable justification for the restriction. Robinson v.
Board of Regents, 475 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1973). Different periods of minority for men
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typified these minimal scrutiny cases at -times approached the bizarre.
One state court, for instance, accepted as a valid state objective the de-
sire to protect an "island on the sea of life reserved for man '38 from
the onslaught of female competitors. Taken as a whole, the older
cases graphically illustrate the ineffectiveness of the permissive ra-
tional basis test in distinguishing classifications which might possibly
have a legitimate basis from those which are due solely to the preju-
diced attitudes of the legislators.3 9
THE TRANSITION TO AiSTRICTER STANDARD
During the late 1960's a change in these attitudes could be de-
tected in the lower courts,40 occasioned by changing societal views to-
ward women as exemplified in new legislation such as the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,41 which forbade employment discrimination on the basis
of sex. During this period it became increasingly clear that the courts
were abandoning the traditional approach, but there was considerable
uncertainty as to what was to take its place. In 1966 a district court
departed from the historical view of sex-based classifications in White
v. Crook42 when it invalidated a statute48 excluding women from jury
and women because women "tend generally to mature physically, emotionally and
mentally before boys" have been held to justify having a lower age of majority for fe-
males. Stanton v. Stanton, 30 Utah 2d 315, 319, 517 P.2d 1010, 1012, cert. granted,
43 U.S.L.W. 3223 (1974).
37. For an article delineating at great length the tenuous nature of some of the rela-
tionships between sex-discriminatory statutes and the questionable objectives involved,
see Johnston & Knapp, supra note 33, at 728. As the authors stated, "Not only are
many forms of sex discrimination vulnerable when subjected to 'rigid scrutiny, ' but they
cannot even survive a serious application of the 'rational basis' test." Id.
38. State v. Hunter, 208 Ore. 282, 287, 300 P.2d 455, 458 (1956) (upholding con-
viction of a female for participating in a professional wrestling competition in violation
of a state statute).
39. The court in Hunter, see note 38 supra and accompanying text, seems to have
based its decision on the prejudicial attitudes of the legislators: "Mhe membership of
the legislative assembly which enacted this statute was predominantly masculine. The
fact is important in determining what the legislature might have had in mind with re-
spect to this particular statute, in addition to its concern for the public weal." Id. at
287, 300 P.2d at 457-58.
40. See, e.g., Mollere v. Southeastern La. College, 304 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. La.
1969); United States ex rel. Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968); Kar-
czewski v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 274 F. Supp. 169 (N.D. IM. 1967); White v. Crook, 251
F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala. 1966); Comnonwealth v. Daniel, 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400
(1968).
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000 et seq. (1970). See also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 686-88 (1973), for a description of how attitudes are changing.
42. 251 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
43. This statute completely excluded women from serving on juries, as contrasted
with Hoyt, where women were excluded unless they volunteered. At the time White
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duty as a denial of equal protection. Clearly this statute could have
been upheld on the same basis as was the statute in Hoyt.44 However,
the court distinguished Hoyt on the ground that in that case women
were not totally excluded from jury service, whereas in White they
were. The court went on to declare that in the instant case, the "ex-
clusion of women from jury service . . . is arbitrary, ' 45 pointing out
that jury service was a form of governmental participation. The case
did not seem to apply the traditional rational basis test since the com-
plete exclusion of women from jury service arguably furthers the goal
of allowing them to fulfill their familial responsibilities, and hence the
rational basis test would have been met.46 Thus, it was unclear what
theory had been used to invalidate the statute.
Two years later, another federal district court, in United States ex
rel. Robinson v. York,47 struck down a statute under which women con-
victs received indefinite sentences whereas men received shorter fixed
sentences. The court rejected the argument that the statute was rea-
sonable under a minimal scrutiny test because women were sentenced
to "rehabilitative farms" for indefinite periods long enough to reform
them, while men, who supposedly were more incorrigible than
women, received definite sentences.48  Apparently, the court felt that
the rational basis standard was inappropriate: "[I1t is difficult to find
any reason why adult women, as one of the specific groups that com-
pose humanity, should have a lesser measure of protection than a racial
group. 49  Since racial classifications are subject to the strict compel-
ling state interest test,5" the court seemed to be implying that sex-based
was decided only three states completely excluded women. Id. at 408 n.14. Currently
no states completely exclude them. See note 33 supra.
44. The statute in Hoyt was upheld on the ground that women's familial responsi-
bilities justified the exclusion. Such responsibilities could also justify a complete exclu-
sion.
45. 251 F. Supp. at 408.
46. See notes 4-6 supra and accompanying text.
47. 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968).
48. The court explained the reason for adopting the disparate sentencing procedure
by saying:
What scant legislative history there is does reveal a belief by those who sup-
ported it at a hearing before the Joint Standing Committee on Humane Institu-
tions in February 1917 that the new institution would provide a reformative
opportunity not available to women in the prison and jails. That hope was
based mostly on features of the proposed farm which are today present in the
prison as well or are of little substance, e.g., farm work, a rural location, a
name with less stigma attached to it, a woman superintendent. Id. at 14-15
n.5.
Petitioner in this case was sentenced to an indefinite term up to three years, whereas
if she had been a man, the maximum sentence for her offense would have been one year
and six months.
49. Id. at 14.
50. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
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classifications should also be subject to such a standard. However, the
court also specifically pointed out that the fundamental interest of lib-
erty was at stake,51 thereby confusing the issue as to the grounds of
the decision-whether it was because a suspect classification or a fund-
amental interest was involved.
The clearest departure from the traditional approach was the
1971 case of Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 2 where the California Supreme
Court struck down a statute similar to the one upheld in Goesaert53
on the ground, inter alia,54 that it violated the equal protection clause.
The Kirby court was the first which explicitly applied the strict scrutiny
standard to a sex-based classification: "The instant case compels the
application of the strict scrutiny standard of review, first, because the
statute limits the fundamental right of one class of persons to pursue
a lawful profession, and, second, because classifications based upon sex
should be treated as suspect." 55 Hence, during the decade after Hoyt
the state of the law with respect to sex-based classifications was one
of change-although the Supreme Court had not yet deviated from its
traditional stance, new attitudes on the part of society, the lower courts,
and legislators were putting pressure on the Court to do so.
The 1971 case of Reed v. Reed5" presented the Supreme Court
with an ideal opportunity to re-examine its approach to classifications
by sex. In Reed, the Court unanimously invalidated a statute 7 which
gave automatic preference to men over women in determining who
should administer a decedent's estate. Unfortunately, the Court's ex-
planation of its rationale was far from clear. The decision purported
to apply the traditional rational basis test: "The question presented
by this case, then, is whether a difference in the sex of competing ap-
plicants for letters of administration bears a rational relationship to a
state objective that is sought to be advanced by the operation of [the
statute]." r5 8 However, the Court summarily rejected the proferred state
interests of avoiding intrafamily controversy and improving administra-
51. 281 F. Supp. at 16.
52. 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
53. Sail'er Inn was not the first case to strike down a Goesaert-type statute. See
note 30 supra. However, the previous cases did not explicitly give their grounds for de-
cision in equal protection terms.
54. The court also held that the statute violated the California Constitution and Ti-
tle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000 et Seq. (1970).
55. 5 Cal. 3d at 17, 485 P.2d at 539, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
56. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
57. IDAHo GEN. LAWS § 15-314 (1948): "Of several persons claiming and equally
entitled to administer, males must be preferred to females, and relatives to those of the
half blood."
58. 404 U.S. at 76.
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tive efficiency. In the Court's view, this was an "arbitrary legislative
choice ' 9 and a denial of equal protection. This language was the most
confusing aspect of the opinion, since the statute was not "arbitrary"
under a traditional rational basis analysis. The Court conceded
that the purposes assigned to the statute were legitimate, and it is
clearly arguable that these purposes were furthered by the legislation. °
The conclusion is inescapable that there was indeed a rational relation-
ship between the classification and a permissible state objective. It
would be difficult to imagine the Court's invalidating a statute which
selected administrators by a noncontroversial criterion (for example,
giving preference to the candidate whose birthdate came first in the
calendar year). Hence, it would seem that the Court could have
reached its decision in Reed only by importing some special protection
for those disadvantaged by a classification based on sex.61
Furthermore, it is apparent that this special protection did not re-
sult from using the new rationality scrutiny test, since this intermediate
standard would have been met if the state could have proved that the
classification actually resulted in a reduction of intrafamily controversy
or an increase in administrative efficiency."' Instead, the defendants
were not even given an opportunity to demonstrate such a relation-
ship."' In fact, the Court strongly implied that even if the statute had
been shown to be efficacious in meeting its goals, it still would have
been struck down. 4
IN SEARCH OF THE Reed PRINCIPLE:
WHAT IS THE CURRENT STANDARD?
The Supreme Court's unanimous opinion in Reed is still the most
59. Id.
60. Id. at 76-77.
61. See Gunther 34:
mhe apparent conformity of the Reed opinion to the model (of rationality
scrutiny, see notes 19-23 supra and accompanying textj is thrown into doubt
by the holding that the sex criterion was "arbitrary," It is difficult to under-
stand that result without an assumption that some special sensitivity to sex as
a classifying factor entered into the analysis . . . . Even if the requirement
be that the means bear a "significant relationship" to the state's purpose, or
contribute substantially to its achievement, the test would seem to have been
met in Reed. Only by importing some special suspicion of sex-related means
from the new equal protection area can the result be made entirely persuasive.
62. The rationality scrutiny test requires that the state bring forth evidence showing
that the legislation furthers a valid objective. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
See also Berkelman v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 501 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir.
1974).
63. The question of the efficacy of the statute appears nowhere in the opinion. In-
stead, after recognizing the legislative goals sought to be achieved by the statute, the
Court summarily dismissed the subject with the epithet "arbitrary." See 404 U.S. at 76.
64. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
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recent definitive pronouncement as to the treatment of classifications
which disadvantage women."' For this reason, subsequent decisions
in the area have commonly been based on the courts' perceptions of
what the Reed Court's analysis actually was. The results have varied
as widely as possible, as judges have cited Reed as standing for each
of the three currently recognized standards of equal protection review.
A typical case which followed Reed in announcing the rational basis
test while applying an unspecified higher standard was Morris
v. Michigan State Board of Education,6 where the Sixth Circuit inval-
idated a high school athletic association regulation prohibiting girls
from engaging in interscholastic athletic contests with boys, to the ex-
tent that the regulation applied to noncontact sports. The court cited
Reed for the proposition that "such a classification is subject to scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
ascertain whether there is a rational relationship to a valid state pur-
pose. 11 7  However, as in Reed, the decision in Morris seems actually to
import some special significance to classifications based on sex, since
the regulation clearly is valid under the traditional rational basis test.
The state objective which could be advanced for such a regulation
would be that of allowing only those of approximately equal ability to
compete against each other. Since the average athletic ability of girls
is lower than that of boys, the regulation would further the state objec-
tive. The fact that there might be a considerable overlap between the
athletic abilities of the two sexes would be of little concern under the
traditional test.68
In clear contrast to Morris is the same court's decision in Robinson
v. Board of Regents, 9 which used Reed as a precedent for applying
65. The more recent cases of Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), and
Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), have not replaced Reed as the most authoritative
decision in this area. Frontiero was a plurality opinion, and Kahn dealt with the dis-
tinct category of "ameliorative" sex-based classifications. For a discussion of Kahn and
its implications, see notes 97-104 infra and accompanying text.
66. 472 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1973).
67. Id. at 1209, citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971).
68. The fact that the results of categorization need not be clinically exact arises
clearly from an examination of the leading cases which have applied the minimal scru-
tiny standard to sex-based classifications. In Muller, there were undoubtedly many
women who would not have been injured by long working hours; in Goesaert, there was
no showing that all women bartenders were more dangerous to good morals than all
male bartenders; and in Hoyt, there were certainly many women who had no family re-
spons ibilites. For a discussion of how closely a statute's effect must match the evil at
which it is aimed (i.e., over and underinclusiveness) under the traditional, rational basis
test, see generally Equal Protection Developments 1084-87. See also Note, supra note
10.
69. 475 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1973). Despite the divergence of theories in the two
cases, Robinson and Morris were both decided by the Sixth Circuit in the same year.
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the minimal scrutiny standard in its pure form. Robinson rejected a
challenge to a state university's dormitory curfew restrictions which
were applicable only to women. Citing Reed for the proposition that
the permissive rationality test is appropriate in sex discrimination
cases, 70 the court refused to find a violation of the equal protection
clause. Since the goal of the restrictions was the safety of women stu-
dents,7 ' the regulations' presumptive validity was not overcome merely
by showing that different sets of rules applied to men and women.
That Robinson represents a retreat from the heightened scrutiny of
Reed and Morris is obvious. The classification in Robinson would ap-
pear to be no more reasonable than the ones in the earlier cases when
one considers the lack of proof (1) that women who were not subject
to dormitory curfews were exposed to more danger than those who
were subject to such curfews or (2) that women unprotected by cur-
fews were exposed to more danger than the men who were not so re-
stricted. 72  Rather, the court seems to have based its decision on un-
founded or untested assumptions about women in much the same man-
ner as did the Courts in Muller, Goesaert, and Hoyt.
One recent case has interpreted Reed as an example of the new
rationality scrutiny model. In Berkelman v. San Francisco Unified
School District,73 the Ninth Circuit explicitly applied this intermediate
standard74 in holding .that a selective public high school which applied
an admissions quota of equal numbers for each sex violated the equal
protection clause where such a policy resulted in higher entrance stand-
ards for girls.75 According to the court, Reed indicated "that sex clas-
sifications are to be tested on the basis of strict rationality, a standard
of review requiring the government (state or federal) to produce evi-
dence that the challenged classification furthers the central purpose of
the classifier.176  In Berkelman, the admissions policy was invalidated
70. Id. at 710, citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971).
71. 475F.2d at 711.
72. In other words, there was no showing that the least restrictive alternative was
used.
73. 501 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1974).
74. The court applied what it called a "strict rationality" standard and cited Gun-
ther's leading article on rationality scrutiny. Id. at 1269; see Gunther 21.
75. This difference amounted to a 3.50 grade point average on a four-point scale
for admission of girls and a 3.25 grade point average for boys. This policy kept 133
girls from being admitted who would have been admitted if equal criteria had been used.
Since the high school involved was a special college preparatory school which offered
significantly more courses and resources than other high schools in the district, this im-
posed a considerable hardship on those denied admission. Opening Brief for Appellants
at 7-8, 24, Berkelman v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 501 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir.
1974).
76. 501 F.2d at 1269.
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because the school failed to prove that since boys overtake girls aca-
demically in high school and college,77 the use of disparate standards
actually promoted a legitimate state end of providing a quality educa-
tion for those who would benefit the most from the experience. Pre-
sumably, if the school had proved its contention, the admissions pro-
cedure would have been held valid.78
No relief from the ambiguities of Reed was provided by -the Su-
preme Court's most recent consideration of a classification which disad-
vantaged women. In Frontiero v. Richardson,79 the Court invalidated
a statute80 which allowed a male member of the armed forces to claim
his wife as a dependent without regard to whether she was in fact de-
pendent upon him, while requiring a woman claimant to show that her
husband was truly dependent. Although eight Justices agreed that the
statute violated the equal protection standard embodied in the fifth
amendment, no theory of review commanded more than a plurality.81
Four members of the Court held that classifications based on sex were
suspect and found "at least implicit support for such an approach in
our unanimous decision only last term in Reed v. Reed .... ,,82 Two
concurring opinions purported to apply the rational basis test as utilized
in Reed and argued that under that standard the statute worked an in-
vidious discrimination.8 3
77. See Opening Brief for Appellants at 56-58, Berkelman v. San Francisco Unified
School Dist., 501 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1974). The school also failed to prove another
point: "No actual proof that a balance of the sexes furthers the goal of better academic
education was offered by the school district." 501 F.2d 1264, 1269 (9th Cir. 1974).
78. Applying the rationality scrutiny test means that if the challenged classification
is factually related to a valid state objective, it will be sustained. See Gunther 21.
79. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
80. 37 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403 (1970); 10 U.S.C. §§ 1072, 1076 (1970). Since this
was a federal statute, the decision was based on the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. See note 1 supra.
81. Justice Brennan announced the judgment and delivered a plurality opinion, in
which Justices Douglas, White, and Marshall joined. Justice Stewart filed a concurring
opinion, and Justice Powell, joined by Justices Burger and Blackmun, filed another con-
curring opinion. Justice Rehnquist dissented, without writing an opinion.
82. 411 U.S. at 682.
83. Justice Stewart simply stated that the statutes worked an invidious discrimma-
tion, citing Reed. 411 U.S. at 691. Justice Powell wanted to decide Frontiero on the
basis of Reed without resort to making sex a suspect classification. Interestingly, he
also declined to make sex a suspect category because of the pending ratification of the
Equal Rights Amendment. Id. at 692. This amendment, H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971); SJ. Res. 8, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), states:
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate leg-
islation, the provisions of the article.
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the dlate of rat-jfi~atiol,
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Hence, the present status of sex-based classifications under the
equal protection clause is in a state of uncertainty. 4 While it is gen-
erally believed that the Muller-Goesaert-Hoyt rationale is no longer
fully applicable, there is the widest possible disagreement as to which
standard to use in its place. Unfortunately, no Supreme Court case
subsequent to Frontiero has directly addressed the question of the ap-
propriate treatment under the equal protection clause of classifications
which disadvantage women. 5
STRIcT SCRUTINY IN Reed
Close examination of Reed indicates that instead of applying any
rationality scrutiny type of review, or even the rational basis test, the
Court actually applied a suspect classification method of analysis,
albeit sub rosa. 8 This interpretation is the only adequate explanation
of why the statute was labeled "arbitrary" despite the fact that both
the traditional rational relation test and the new rationality scrutiny test
would have been satisfied s 7  Furthermore, the opinion strongly sug-
For a discussion of this amendment, see Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal
Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J.
871 (1971).
84. Compare Miskunas v. Union Carbide Corp., 399 F.2d 847 (7th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1066 (1969), and Stanton v. Stanton, 30 Utah 2d 315, 517 P.2d 1010
(1974), where the courts applied the traditional rational basis test to sex-based classifi-
cations and sustained them, with Karczewski v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 274 F. Supp. 169
(N.D. IM. 1967), and Commonwealth v. Daniel, 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400 (1968),
where the courts purported to apply the traditional test, but invalidated statutes which
discriminated on the basis of sex. Another variation is exemplified by Sail'er Inn, Inc.
v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971), where the strict scrutiny
standard was applied. Yet another approach is seen in Berkelman v. San Francisco Uni-
fied School Dist., 501 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1974), where the court applied the intermedi-
ate test of rationality scrutiny.
85. Two other recent Supreme Court cases have addressed the sex-discrimination is-
sue, at least tangentially, but neither of them is directly on point. Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), involved a suit by two pregnant public school
teachers who challenged mandatory unpaid leave rules. However, the holding which
struck down these regulations was based on due process rather than equal protection.
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), held that where California's disability insur-
ance program exempted from coverage any work loss due to normal pregnancy, there
was no denial of equal protection. However, in the Court's view, this program did not
discriminate on the basis of sex since, 'There was no risk from which men are protected
and women are not.' Id. at 496-97 n.20. Because the cases concerning pregnancies
are not simply sex-discrimination cases, but involve something more, this Note will not
discuss them in depth.
86. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682-88 (1973) (plurality opinion);
Brenden v. Independent School Dist., 477 F.2d 1292, 1296 (8th Cir. 1973); cf. Getman,
supra note 19, at 164-65 ("It seems likely that Reed and Stanley are the forerunners
of a policy of strict review in cases involving discrimination on the basis of sex."); Gun-
ther 34.
87. See text accompanying notes 58-61 supra.
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gests the applicability in sex discrimination cases of the "compelling in-
terest" and "less restrictive alternative" aspects of the stricter level of
review. Despite their legitimacy as legislative goals, 8 administrative
efficiency and the reduction of familial strife were not sufficient to jus-
tify the statute in Reed. The Court's language also permits the conclu-
sion that it would have upheld a statute which furthered these "positive
values" by a means less restrictive of rights which the Court considered
important.8 9 Significantly, these factors are the same as those that are
taken into account in determining the constitutionality of a suspect
classification, such as race, under the equal protection clause.90
Furthermore, an examination of the policies giving rise to the the-
ory of suspect classifications will show the desirability of including sex-
ual classifications in this group.91 This doctrine requires that a discrete
group in society should not be singled out for invidious treatment
merely on the basis of traditional, stereotyped notions.92 Politically im-
potent, these groups are generally characterized by features with which
they were born and which they cannot change.9 3 Prejudice concerning
these groups becomes embodied in legislation, often not because of the
desire to achieve a proper governmental objective, but because of pop-
ular beliefs as to the inferiority and "differentness" of the members of
the groups.9 4 This model applies to the position of women exactly,
88. See 404 U.S. at 76: "Clearly the objective of reducing the workload on probate
courts by eliminating one class of contests is not without some legitimacy. The crucial
question, however, is whether . .. this statute] advances that objective in a manner
consistent with the command of the Equal Protection Clause. We hold that it does not."
89. See note 88 supra.
90. See Getman, supra note 19, at 162.
91. For a discussion of the policy arguments behind suspect classifications, see
Note, Ameliorative Racial Classifications Under the Equal Protection Clause: DeFunis
v. Odegaard, 1973 DuKE L.J 1126, 1147; Equal Protection Developments 1107; Com-
ment, Are Sex-Based Classifications Constitutionally Suspect?, 66 Nw. U.L. Rlv. 481,
496 (1971).
92. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938):
"[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied
upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching
judicial inquiry."
93. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973):
Moreover, since sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable char-
acteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special
disabilities upon the members of a particular sex because of their sex would
seem to violate "the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear
some relationship to individual responsibility .... " Weber v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
94. For a discussion of the stigma of inferiority attached to such groups, see Sail'er
Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 19, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 340-41, 485 P.2d 529, 540-41
(1971).
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as it is indeed true that they have been a politically powerless group,
singled out for a legislative treatment which in effect keeps them in
an inferior status and is often based on traditional notions of sexual
roles and capabilities. 95 Because of the strong policy reasons for apply-
ing the highest standard of review in sex discrimination cases, it is in-
appropriate either to continue the automatic validation of discrimina-
tory statutes under the minimal rationality test or to subject this area
of the law to the vagaries of the rationality scrutiny test with its heavy
emphasis upon the fact-gathering abilities of counsel.
AMELIORATIvE SEX-BASED CLASSIFICATIONS
Immediately upon this conclusion, however, one is faced with the
problem of ameliorative sex-based classifications-those which attempt
to alleviate the effects of past discrimination."6 Should such classifica-
tions be treated in the same manner as those which disadvantage
women, or are they to be scrutinized under a less rigorous standard?
Two recent Supreme Court cases have attempted to deal with this
question: Kahn v. Shevin97 and Schlesinger v. Ballard.95  In Kahn, a
Florida statute giving widows a $500 exemption from the property tax
while denying the same exemption to widowers was sustained against
an equal protection attack. The Court used the traditional language
of the rational basis test in stating that the statute was "reasonably de-
signed to further the state policy of cushioning the financial impact of
spousal loss upon the sex for whom that loss imposes a disproportion-
ately heavy burden."'99 The general standard was the familiar minimal
scrutiny requirement that a classification must have a "fair and sub-
stantial relation to the object of the legislation." 100  In a footnote the
95. See Johnston & Knapp, supra note 33, at 738-40.
96. It should be clearly understood that an ameliorative classification is not simply
one that is favorable towards women. Rather, it is one which improves women's posi-
tion, and in this context, it is one which alleviates the effects of past discrimination.
WEBsrEr's Tn NEw INTERNATIONAL DIrCONARY (1961) defines ameliorate as "to
make better: improve." The opinion in Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), seemed
to recognize this definition when it said:
And in Frontiero the plurality opinion also noted that the statutes there were
"not in any sense designed to rectify the effects of past discrimination against
women. On the contrary, these statutes seize upon a group-women-who
have historically suffered discrimination in employment, and rely on the effects
of this past discrimination as a justification for heaping on additional econo-
mic disadvantages." Id. at 355 n.8 (citation omitted).
97. 416 U.S. 351 (1974). It is interesting to note that Justice Douglas, who wrote
the opinion in Kahn, agreed with the plurality in Frontiero that sex was a suspect class-
ification. See 411 U.S. at 682-88.
98. 43 U.S.L.W. 4158 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1975).
99. 416 U.S. at 355.
100. Id., citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971), quoting Royster Guano Co.
v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
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Court rejected the contention that a better means of achieving this goal
should be required, thus explicitly refusing to apply the less restrictive
alternative requirement of the strict scrutiny test.0 10
Kahn, then, rejected the proposition -that ameliorative classifica-
tions based on sex are unconstitutional under the strict scrutiny stand-
ard in that they are not based on a compelling state interest, a view-
point urged by the dissenters in that case. 10 2  Neither did Kahn decide
that such classifications, although subject to strict scrutiny, are justified
by a compelling state interest. The highest level of equal protection
review was simply not applied at all. Furthermore, it is evident that
the new rationality scrutiny test was not used. The Court made
no attempt to determine the efficacy of the exemption in achieving the
desired objective of equalizing the financial positions of widows and
widowers, nor was the state required to come forward with evidence
on this point.
However, Kahn should not be taken as having restored the mini-
mal scrutiny standard for all sex-based classifications. In endorsing the
statute's purpose of cushioning the financial impact of spousal loss only
for widows, the Court recognized that women generally have not
earned as much money as men and that such differences in income
have frequently resulted from sex discrimination. 03 Frontiero was dis-
tinguished explicitly on this basis. In Frontiero, the classification was
"solely for administrative convenience"' 0 whereas in Kahn the distinc-
tion was imposed for the purpose of aiding widows in their financial
plight, due in part to past discrimination. The clear implication is that
the rational basis standard is appropriate for reviewing those sex-based
101. Id. at 356 n.1O. Indeed, if the Court had applied this requirement, it is clear
that it would not have been met, for lack of a showing either that all widows are more
impecunious than all widowers or that all widows who pay property taxes are in finan-
cial need. A more narrowly drawn statute would have been necessary to reach only
those widows who were financially disadvantaged.
102. In one dissenting opinion, Justices Brennan and Marshall claimed: "The statute
nevertheless fails to satisfy the requirements of equal protection, since the State has not
borne its burden of proving that its compelling interest could not be achieved by a more
precisely tailored statute or by use of feasible less drastic means." Id. at 360 (Brennan
& Marshall, JJ., dissenting). Justice White also dissented: "There is merit in giving
poor widows a tax break, but gender-based classifications are suspect and require more
justification than the State has offered." Id. at 361 (White, J., dissenting).
103. There can be no dispute that the financial difficulties confronting the
lone woman in Florida or in any other state exceed those facing the man.
Whether from overt discrimination or from the socialization process of a male
dominated culture, the job market is inhospitable to the woman seeking any
but the lowest paid job . . . . [D]ata compiled by the Women's Bureau of
the United States Department of Labor shows that in 1972 a woman working
full time had a median income which was only 57.9% of the median for
males . . . . Id. at 353.
104. Id. at 355.
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classifications which alleviate the effects of past invidious discrimina-
tion.
In its most recent decision in this area, the Court reaffirmed the
appropriateness of permissive review for ameliorative classifications.
Schlesinger v. Ballard..5 sustained the constitutionality of federal legis-
lation1° 6 which granted tenure preferences to female naval officers.1 17
Using the equal protection standard inherent in the due process clause
of the fifth amendment, 08 the Court held that the statute was a per-
missible means of providing women an equitable program of advance-
ment in the Navy. The Court's rationale relied heavily upon the fact
that naval personnel practices offered women less favorable opportu-
nities to compile impressive service records. 09 Since the legislative
classification furthered the ameliorative purpose of compensating fe-
male officers for this unequal treatment, it fell squarely within the am-
bit of Kahn.110
THE Kahn PRINCIPLE IN THE LOWER COURTS
Two cases subsequent to Kahn, but prior to Ballard, have sus-
tained the constitutionality of ameliorative classifications, and each sub-
scribed to the foregoing view of the Kahn rationale. Kohr v. Wein-
berger"' sustained the benefits computation formula of the Social Se-
curity Act, " 2 which permits women to use fewer years than similarly
situated men to compute their "average monthly wage' from which
monthly benefits are determined, thus eliminating more years of lower
105. 43 U.S.L.W. 4158 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1975).
106. 10 U.S.C. § 6401 (1970).
107. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4161.
108. See note 1 supra.
109.- Id. at 4161. The Corot reasoned that since "male and female line officers
in the Navy are not similarly situated with respect to opportunities for professional serv-
ice. . . female lieutenants will not generally have compiled records of seagoing service
comparable to those of male lieutenants." Id.
110. The Court, however, also chose to justify its opinion on the basis that different
treatment of male and female officers was necessary in order for the Navy to attract
and motivate qualified female officers. Id. at 4162.
111. 378 F. Supp. 1299 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
112. 42U.S.C. § 415(b)(3) (1970):
(3) For purposes of paragraph (2), the number of an individual's elapsed
years is the number of calendar years after 1950 (or, if later, the year in
which he attained age 21) and before-
(A) in the case of a woman, the year in which she died or, if it occurred
earlier but after 1960, the year in which she attained age 62,
(B) in the case of a man who has died, the year in which he died, or
if it occurred earlier but after 1960, the year in which he attained
age 65, or
(C) in the case of a man who has not died, the year occurring after
1960 in which he attained (or would attain) age 65.
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earnings than are eliminated for men. The court reached its conclu-
sion by applying the permissive rational basis test. Although the rea-
sons for selecting that test were not explicitly set forth in the opinion,
the court recognized that a distinction should be made between statutes
which rectify the effects of past discrimination and those which invid-
iously discriminate, and interpreted Kahn as standing for this proposi-
tion.113 Its holding is phrased both in terms of the ameliorative prin-
ciple and the rational basis test.
[W]e are satisfied that . . . [the statute] is well within the con-
stitutional limits set in . . . [Reed and Kahn] in that the statutory
classification is reasonable and not arbitrary, and has a fair and sub-
stantial relationship to the object of the legislation because its effect is to
rectify the economic effects of past discrimination against women. 1 4
Another successor case to Kahn is People v. Elliot,"5 where the
Colorado Supreme Court held that a criminal statute imposing the obli-
gation for child support solely on the father did not violate the equal
protection clause. In applying the rational basis test, the court relied
upon the fact that men's economic advantages made them generally
better able than women to cope with the burden of child support. As
in Kahn, the exemption of women from a pecuniary obligation was jus-
tified by the continuing effects of unequal opportunities in the economic
area.
The proposition that men generally are more economically favored
and, therefore, better able to support their children, is not entirely
an obsolete concept. In April of this year the United States Supreme
Court gave judicial notice to -this view in sustaining a five hundred
dollar property tax exemption to widows but not to widowers, in Kahn
v. Shevin .... 116
113. See 378 F. Supp. at 1303-04. At one point in the opinion, the court discussed
Reed and Frontiero and cited them for the view that the Supreme Court is adopting a
stricter standard for sex discrimination cases. Id. at 1303. At another point, the court
spoke in terms of justifying the statute by a "compelling governmental interest." Id.
The court finally decided to apply the rational basis test, relying upon, inter alia, the
Kahn holding as applicable precedent. Id. at 1304.
114. Id. The constitutionality of the same section of the Social Security Act was
considered in Gruenwald v. Gardner, 390 F.2d 591 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 982
(1968). There the court decided, using reasoning similar to that used in Kohr although
the case was considered before Kahn or Reed had been handed down, that the reduction
of economic disparities between men and women justified sustaining the statute. But
see Note, Sex Classifications in the Social Security Benefit Structure, 49 IND. L.I. 181,
183-84 (1973), which suggested that the early retirement scheme is simply a reflection
of the societal view that women are not the primary wage earners.
115. 525 P.2d 457 (Colo. 1974).
116. Id. at 460.
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It is therefore clear that Kahn, Ballard, and the subsequent lower
court decisions' 17 show a judicial willingness to exempt ameliorative
classifications from the sub rosa strict scrutiny test of Reed. This
exemption is well founded since the policy reasons for imposing a strict
standard of review"18 simply do not apply when the distinction based
on sex alleviates the effects of past discrimination.1 9 Strict scrutiny
of classifications which disadvantage women is appropriate because of
women's traditionally inferior political and economic status, which in
turn derives from stereotyped ideas concerning their capabilities. In
contrast, the very purpose of ameliorative classifications is to help re-
move the effects of such stereotyped treatment. These classifications
are designed to place women in the position which they would have
occupied but for -the past discrimination. 20  Requiring strict scrutiny
in such cases would be self-defeating, since the effect would be to aid
in perpetuating the only sex-related status which satisfies the policy
reasons for strict review. A similar policy analysis will show that Kahn
and its successors have properly used the rational basis test in judging
the constitutionality of ameliorative classifications. No other test would
be consistent with the basic principle of the equal protection clause--
to treat those who are similarly situated in a similar manner.' 2 - Be-
cause of the continuing effects of sexual bias, men and women are not
similarly situated. Since an ameliorative classification treats men dif-
ferently from women only in order to overcome the barriers of past
discrimination so that they can become similarly situated with men, it
serves to further the aim of equal protection. For this reason, the only
117. See Murphy v. Murphy, 232 Ga. 352, 206 S.E.2d 458 (1974), petition for cert.
filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3216 (U.S. Sept. 9, 1974) (No. 74-255), which upheld a Georgia
divorce statute authorizing alimony and attorneys' fee awards only to wives as reason-
ably designed to further the state policy of cushioning the financial impact of spousal
loss upon the sex for whom that loss imposes the disporportionately heavy burden.
118. See notes 91-95 supra and accompanying text.
119. See Ginsburg, Toward Elimination of Sex-Based Discrimination: Constitu-
tional Aspects, in AssocIATboN OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOoLs, SYMPOSIUM ON THE LAW
SCHOOL CURRCULUM AND THE LEaAL RIGHTS OF WOMEN 29-30 (Part I 1972); cf. Ely,
The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Cm. L. REv. 723 (1974).
Ely's thesis is that certain classifications based on race which favor Blacks are constitu-
tional and are to be judged under a lenient standard of review: "Rather than asserting
that the demands of 'special scrutiny' can be met. . . I shall suggest that 'special scru-
tiny' is not appropriate when White people have decided to favor Black people at the
expense of White people." Id. at 727. Ely's reasoning is based on the idea that the
policy arguments for labeling a criterion such as race to be suspect do not apply in the
reverse case.
120. This characteristic is implicit in the definition of an ameliorative classification.
See note 96 supra.
121. See note 92 supra and accompanying text.
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relevant inquiry is whether a challenged classification is reasonably re-
lated to its ameliorative purpose. Invidious sex-based classifications
cannot rely on this rationale and are therefore subject to a stricter
standard.
THE IMPACT OF THE BIFURCATED TEST
Once it has been determined that the new bifurcated standard is
the appropriate one for sex-based classifications, the remaining ques-
tion is the effect which explicit recognition of the new test should have
in those areas where distinctions on the basis of sex are most commonly
drawn.
Employment
Discriminatory employment practices have been the focus of much
attention. Those which are the result of governmental action must be
justified in terms of equal protection standards.122 Under the proposed
test, most of the practices currently described as "female protective
laws"' 23 would be unconstitutional. These laws typically provide for
maximum hours of labor, minimum wages, and restrictions on working
conditions under which women may be employed. Such regulations
generally disadvantage women by restricting their employment oppor-
tunities and cannot be said to have as their aim the elimination of past
discriminatory effects. Hence, they would receive strict scrutiny under
the equal protection clause. Few of these statutes would meet such
a standard. Although the protection of women from extremely taxing
physical work might possibly be a compelling interest, these "protective"
statutes are seldom so narrowly drawn.124
The most controversial issue in this field is the use of affirmative
action programs which remedy employment discrimination by giving
preferred treatment to women in the hiring, transfer, and promotion
processes.'2 5 Since those contracting with the government are en-
couraged by executive order1 8 to implement such programs in order to
122. See note 1 supra.
123. See note 26 supra.
124. See Dorsen & Ross, The Necessity of a Constitutional Amendment, 6 HAv.
Civ. Rrsrs-Civ. Lm. L. Rav. 216, 222-23 (1971).
125. These preferences include hiring goals for women employees akin to quotas, ex-
tensive recruitment efforts, and the promotion or transfer of women at a more favorable
rate than men. See, e.g., Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 43 U.S.L.W. 2160 (E.D.
Va. Sept. 25, 1974); cf. Legal Aid Soe'y v. Brennan, 43 U.S.L.W. 2019 (N.D. Cal. June
20, 1974).
126. Exec. Order No. 11246, § 202(1), 3 C.F.R. 169, 170 (1974), states:
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ensure that there are no discriminatory employment practices, affirm-
ative action programs will become increasingly common. The recent
case of Patterson v. American Tobacco Co.127 presented a challenge
to an affirmative action program in which the employer, in order to
remedy past discrimination in pay, job classifications, and promotions,
gave priority to black and female employees over white male employ-
ees having less seniority but higher job classifications. Although the
action was brought under Title VII, the court's discussion of the pro-
gram's ameliorative character would be equally valid in an equal pro-
tection analysis: "The relief is warranted, however, where past dis-
crimination has allowed those persons greater job opportunity than
more senior blacks and females. 128  Therefore, the court sustained
the program. Patterson exemplifies the proper treatment under the
bifurcated test for affirmative programs designed to eliminate discrim-
ination. Clearly these programs are ameliorative; thus, they would be
subject to the rational basis test and would be sustained as long as they
arguably worked to alleviate past effects of discrimination. However,
this analysis would not permit unlimited favoritism of women em-
ployees. Presumably, a level could be reached where -the preferences
could not be justified in terms of removing past discriminatory effects.
Such classifications would fail for lack of a reasonable relationship to
the purpose of amelioration.
Selective Service
Another highly publicized issue is how women's exemption from
the draft should be treated. Although personnel are not now being
drafted, the draft along with the equal protection problem, may be res-
urrected at some future time. Clearly this exemption benefits wom-
en. Furthermore, all decisions which have dealt with this situa-
tion under the equal protection clause129 have sustained the Selective
The contractor will not discriminate against any employee or applicant for
employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The con-
tractor will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and
that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race,
color, religion, sex or national origin. Such action shall include, but not be
limited to the following: employment, upgrading, demotion, or transfer; re-
cruitment or recruitment advertising; layoff or termination; rates of pay or
other forms of compensation; and selection for training, including apprentice-
ship.
Cf. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14 (1974).
127. 43 U.S.L.W. 2160 (E.D. Va. Sept. 25, 1974).
128. Id. at 2161.
129. See United States v. Dorris, 319 F. Supp. 1306 (W.D. Pa. 1970); United States
v. Cook, 311 F. Supp. 618 (W.D. Pa. 1970); United States v. Clinton, 310 F. Supp.
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Service Act.130  A typical example of the judicial reasoning on this
point is United States v. St. Clair' where the court maintained: "In
providing for involuntary service for men and voluntary service for
women, Congress followed the teachings of history that if a nation is
to survive, men must provide the first line of defense while women
keep the home fires burning.' 32  However, under the proposed test,
a different decision would be required. Since the statute does not tend
to eliminate the effects of past discrimination, it is not ameliorative;
hence, an application of strict scrutiny is necessary. It is clear that the
draft mechanism does not satisfy the less restrictive alternative require-
ment of the strict scrutiny standard, since -the classification is both un-
derinclusive and overinclusive. Men who have familial responsibilities
are not included in the exemption whereas women who do not have
such responsibilities are nevertheless exempted. A more narrowly
drawn statute would allow both men and women who wish to obtain
an exemption on the ground of maintaining an orderly domestic life
to apply for such an exemption and to have the merits of their claims
evaluated. Furthermore, most military personnel today are not in com-
bat positions, and warfare is becoming increasingly technological. Be-
cause of the resulting decrease in the importance of physical strength
in the modern military, it is doubtful that a compelling state interest
for the draft exemption could be found.'
CONCLUSION
The proposed test for sex-based classifications has as its basic ra-
tionale the elimination of any invidious discrimination based on sex,
whether this discrimination is caused by ongoing practices or is simply
the effect of past practices. In order -to implement this policy, the test
333 (E.D. La. 1970); Suskin v. Nixon, 304 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Ill. 1969); United States
v. St. Clair, 291 F. Supp. 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
130. 5 U.S.C. App. §§ 451 et seq. (1970).
131. 291 F. Supp. 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
132. Id. at 125.
133. In 1948, General Eisenhower stated:
Like most old soldiers I was violently against women soldiers. I thought a tre-
mendous number of difficulties would occur, not only of an administrative na-
ture... but others of a more personal type that would get us into trouble.
None of that occurred. .. . In the disciplinary field they were. . . a model
for the Army. More than this their influence throughout the entire command
was good. I am convinced that in another war they have got to be draftedjust like the men. Ginsburg, supra note 120, at 20, quoting Hearings on S.
1614 Before the Subcomm. on Organization and Mobilization of the House
Comm. on Armed Services, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 5563-64 (1948).
See also Hale & Kanowitz, Women and the Draft. A Response to Critics of the Equal
Rights Amendment, 23 HAsTiNGs L.. 199 (1971).
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stipulates two levels of review-strict scrutiny for purely discriminatory
classifications and permissive review for ameliorative classifications.
Under this standard, discrimination which has no useful purpose is dis-
couraged while discrimination which contributes to the equality of the
sexes is allowed, a result which could not be as effectively reached by
one level of review for all sex-based classifications.
